An approach initiated in 4] is shown to unify results about the existence of (i) Nash equilibria in games with at most countably many players, (ii) Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions for large, anonymous games, and (iii) Nash equilibria (both mixed and pure) for continuum games. A new, central notion of mixed externality is developed for this purpose.
Introduction
In 4] a new analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibrium distributions was given by characterizing these as solutions of an associated variational inequality in terms of transition probabilities. In that paper the use of some key results from Young measure theory made it possible to formulate a rather powerful existence result for equilibrium distributions. This was shown to generalize equilibrium results in 15, 17] (and also those of 15], as was shown recently 5]). Recall that Young measure theory is basically a theory of narrow convergence for transition probabilities 2, 3, 7, 22, 23] which extends the classical notion of narrow (or weak) convergence for probability measures.
In this paper the ideas of 4] will be expanded considerably, and it will be shown that a whole class of Nash equilibrium results can be obtained in this way. In itself, it is not surprising that Young measure theory should play an important role in equilibrium existence questions for game theory. Rather, it seems surprising that the narrow topology for transition probabilities had not been used before for such purposes. Indeed, if we think of a set of players T , then it is standard to let each player t 2 T choose a probability measure, say (t), on the set of all actions available to him/her. Therefore, the combined e ect of these choices of the players is to yield a transition probability, viz. the mapping t 7 ! (t). Since it is evident that Nash equilibrium questions for such games can be cast into the form of some xed point problem for the 's, one is led naturally to consider the topologization of the space of all transition probabilities, for which the narrow topology turns out to be an ideal candidate. As could be expected, when the set T of players is nite or countably in nite, use of the Young measure theory adds nothing of interest, for then its topology is simply equivalent to the classical narrow topology for (products of) probability measures. It is rather when T is uncountable that the Young measure topology adds new insights to the study of Nash equilibria, and this the present paper will demonstrate.
To make suitable use of the Young measure topology, a key notion of mixed externality is formulated here. For some of the equilibrium results considered such a mixed externality has a known form. For other results, phrased in terms of pure Nash equilibria, the mixed externality is both new and arti cial. The basic pattern is then as follows: instead proving the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium solution right away, the existence question is rst resolved for a mixed version of the problem. Once this has been done, it is easy to derive existence of a pure equilibrium solution from it by means of well-known methods of puri cation. In this way we obtain a new, powerful approach which simultaneously addresses several existence questions for classical noncooperative games. Until now, a coherent approach to these subjects was not available. Along the way, we shall also obtain some real improvements of existing results in this area.
The setup of this paper is as follows: First, notions and terminology are established concerning the mixed externality notion for games in normal form. Then Theorem 2.1, the main theorem for mixed Nash equilibrium pro les, is stated, as is Proposition 2.1, the main supporting tool for puri cation. Next, these central results are then used to derive the existence (i) of a mixed Nash equilibrium solution for a classical game (subsection 3.1), (ii) of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution (subsection 3.2), and (iii) of pure Nash equilibria for continuum games in two essentially di erent situations (subsections 3.3, 3.4). As for (i), our Theorem 3. 
Central notions and results
This section starts with an introduction of the mixed externality notion for games in normal form. After this, the main equilibrium existence result is stated for a mixed version of the game (Theorem 2.1). This is followed by Proposition 2.1, the main puri cation tool.
Let (T; T ; ) be a nite measure space of players; it is convenient to suppose (T) = 1. Let S be a metric space of actions. Each player t has to restrict her/his actions to a certain subset of S, denoted by S t . Each set S t is supposed to belong to the Borel -algebra B(S), i.e., the -algebra generated by all open subsets of S. The set of all probability measures on (S; B(S)) is denoted by M + 1 (S). On some occasions we shall also write (t) := S t , so as to emphasize the fact that : t 7 ! S t forms a multifunction. We shall consider transition probabilities (alias Young measures) : T ! M + 1 (S), such that for -a.e. t one has (t)(S t ) = 1. Such transition probabilities will be called mixed (action) pro les, and the set of all of these is denoted by R. See 18, III.2] for general measure-theoretical details on transition probabilities; here we just recall that a function : T ! M + 1 (S) is called a transition probability if t 7 ! (t)(B) is T -measurable for every xed set B 2 B(S). The pro le expresses that each player t has chosen (t) 2 M + 1 (S) for her/his mixed action; moreover, apart from some null set of players, each player t has chosen (t) in such a way so as to result in an action in the proper subset S t . A special subset of R is made up by the pure action pro les; namely, a pro le 2 R is said to be pure if it corresponds to a measurable function from T into S such that for all t (t) = f (t) := Dirac probability at f (t).
It is clear that in this case the de nition of R forces f to belong to the set S of all measurable a.e. selections of the multifunction : t 7 ! S t . Let P t : R ! ?1; +1) be player t's payo function; P t ( ) measures t's personal bene t if the mixed pro le 2 R is somehow realized. Naturally, for every player t it is important to distinguish the "internal" part (t) of 2 R, over which t has total control, from any other part, called "external" for contrast, over which player t may have at most partial in uence. =i S j , ?i := j6 =i j (product measure), etc. Since ?i is a probability measure on S ?i , it can also be regarded as a probability measure on the larger set S n?1 . So the the internal- (This is slightly less straightforward than might have been expected, because of our intention to keep the space Y common to all players.) A game with countably in nitely many players can, of course, be treated in essentially the same way.
Example 2.2 Consider T = 0; 1] as the set of players, equipped with the Borel or Lebesguealgebra T and the Lebesgue measure . Let S be a separable Banach space E; suppose that for every t the set (t) := S t E is closed and convex. Suppose also that there exists an integrable function : 0; 1] ! R such that kxk (t) for all x 2 S t (here kxk denotes the norm on E). By de nition, each in R is a transition probability from : 0; 1] ! M + 1 (E) such that (t)(S t ) = 1 for -a.e. t.
By the integrable boundedness condition it follows that
So in the rst place we conclude that On the exceptional null set involved here, we set bar (t) := 0. It is easy to see that t 7 ! bar (t), thus de ned, is integrable. Therefore, a mixed externality mapping e from R into Y := L 1 0; 1] is well-de ned by . The reader's attention is called to the following notational rule, which is obeyed throughout: prequotient spaces are denoted by script L's, and quotient spaces by straight L's. So as to have internal-external form with respect to the above speci cation of e, the payo P t must be as follows:
In particular, for pure pro les f this entails Our main concern will be with the following classical equilibrium notion, which is due to Nash; for the games with payo s in the above internal-external form it runs as follows:
De nition 2.1 A mixed pro le 2 R is said to be a mixed Nash equilibrium pro le if (t)(arg max x2St U t (x; e t ( ))) = 1 for -a.e. t in T. The fact that a null set of players is allowed to escape the above requirement might be less desirable for certain models; however, we stress that the present analysis is strictly tied to the de nition as given above. We shall now prepare our main Nash equilibrium existence result by listing the assumptions that must be satis ed. Together with the previous assumption, this guarantees that U t ( ; e t ( )) is bounded from above on S t by a constant; therefore, the integral in the internal-external form representation of P t ( ) is well-de ned. Section 4 is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.1, which follows essentially the approach of 4]. The usefulness of this existence result will become apparent in the next section, sometimes in conjunction with the following su cient condition for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium pro le. Proof Since is mixed Nash, it must be that for -almost all t the probability measure (t) is carried by the set arg max x2St U t (x; e t ( ) 
Applications
We shall now consider essentially four di erent applications of Theorem 2.1. The rst application addresses the rather classical situation considered in Example 2.1. The second one works with Mas-Colell's notion of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium distribution 17]. The third application places additional convexity and quasiconcavity conditions on the basic ingredients of the game, in a setting for continuum games which is somewhat more general than the one used by Schmeidler 21 ] (see Example 2.2). The fourth application, formulated for continuum games in the same setup, is based on the requirement that Y , the space of pro le statistics, is nite-dimensional and the measure is nonatomic.
Classical n-person games
In this subsection we consider the situation of Example 2.1. Assumption 3.1.1 S i is a nonempty compact metric space for every i 2 I. Assumption 3.1.2 V i is upper semicontinuous and bounded above on j S j for every i 2 I. Assumption 3.1.3 V i (x i ; ) is bounded and continuous on j6 =i S i for every x i 2 S i and i 2 I. Theorem 3.1.1 Suppose that Assumptions 3.1.1{3.1.3 hold. Then there exists an n-vector := ( 1 ; 2 ; : : : ; n ), consisting of probability measures i 2 M + 1 (S i ), such that for each i 2 I P i ( ) P i ( i ?i ) for every i 2 M + 1 (S i ): Proof. As in Example 2.1, rather than taking S to be the topological sum of the S i 's (which is now obviously compact and metrizable by Assumption 3.1.1), we suppose without loss of generality that all S i 's are subsets of a compact metric space S. We apply Theorem 2.1 to Y := M + 1 (S n?1 ), equipped with the classical weak topology. As in Example 2.1, we set 
Large anonymous games
Again, let M + 1 (S) stand for the space of of probability measures on S, equipped with the classical narrow (or weak) topology. Recall that this is the coarsest topology for which the functionals 
t)(B) (dt); B 2 B(S):
We shall now use the mixed externality e : 7 ! j S . Observe how this has the e ect of mixing the individual probability measures (t), t 2 T , which means that in a certain sense the players in uence their opponents only anonymously. 1 may be applied, and this gives existence of a mixed Nash equilbrium pro le . We nish by applying Proposition 2.1: Let f := bar ; then the rst condition of the proposition holds trivially. It remains to show that its third condition (being equivalent to the second one) holds: By Assumptions 2.4 and 3.3.3 the set arg max x2St U t (x; e( )) is closed and convex. By Theorem 2.1, (t) is carried by this set. Therefore, f (t), the barycenter of (t), also belongs to it for a.e. t. Q.E.D. Theorem 3.3.1 generalizes a well-known theorem of Schmeidler 21, Theorem 1] completely and its extension by Khan 14, Theorem 7.1] partly in the following sense: Khan supposes U (t; ; ) to be continuous on S t L 1 , which is certainly more than Assumptions 2.4{2.6 ask for. Also, Khan requires all S t to lie in one xed weakly compact subset of E, which is much heavier than Assumption 3.3.2 (a fair portion of 14, section 7] is spent on attempts to improve on this). On the other hand, although the above result can almost automatically be extended to a setup where an abstract measure space (T; T ; ) replaces ( 0; 1]; T ; ) (indeed, Theorem 2.1 naturally deals with this situation), the Suslin Assumption 2.1 for Y := L 1 (T) forces certain restrictions on the measure space (T; T ; ). For instance, if T were countably generated, then L 1 E (T) is a Polish space for the L 1 -norm topology, so L 1 (T) becomes Suslin for the weak topology. Even though this restriction might seem fairly weak, it should be observed that 14] requires nothing of this kind.
Continuum games with convexity
As in Example 2.2, we suppose in this subsection that the space of actions S is a separable Banach space (E; k k). This Banach space is equipped with a locally convex topology ! which is not stronger than the norm topology and not weaker than the weak topology. Unless the contrary is explicitly mentioned
Continuum games with nonatomicity
In this subsection S is once more supposed to be a metrizable Suslin space. However, we now need to assume that the probability space (T; T ; ) is nonatomic. Except for the fact that this probability space now replaces 0; 1], our present model will be as in Example 2.3 in all other respects. By e( ) = e( f ), this is precisely (2.1). By Proposition 2.1 it therefore follows that f is a Nash equilibrium pro le. From this the stated result follows directly. Q.E.D. it is enough to prove the same inequality with g replaced by g n for any n (indeed, an application of the monotone convergence theorem then easily implies the above inequality). So x n; note that g n (t; x; e t ( )) g n (t; x; e t ( 0 )) ? nd Y (e t ( ); e t ( 0 )); by the Lipschitz-property of g n . Integrating successively over (t) and gives 
